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Abstract: We treat secret key extraction when the eavesdropper has correlated
quantum states. We propose quantum privacy amplification theorems different
from Renner’s, which are based on quantum conditional Re´nyi entropy of order
1+ s. Using those theorems, we derive an exponential decreasing rate for leaked
information and the asymptotic equivocation rate, which have not been derived
hitherto in the quantum setting.
1. Introduction
Extracting secret random numbers in the presence of quantum attacker is one
of important topics in quantum information theory. The classical version of this
topic was discussed by [2,6,7,9,13]. The quantum version is mainly treated by
Renner[8] and his collaborators with using universal2 hash function. Indeed, a
universal2 hash function can be implemented with small amount of calculation.
As is shown by Renner[8], when the classical random variable is correlated with
eavesdropper’s quantum state, applying a universal2 hash function as a privacy
amplification process, we obtain a secret random variable.
When the size of generated final random variable is sufficiently small, the
final bits are almost independent of eavesdropper’s quantum state. Then, it is
needed to evaluate the leaked information of the protocol using a universal2 hash
function. In order to evaluate the secrecy, Renner[8] showed a privacy amplifi-
cation theorem under the trace norm distance with the conditional Re´nyi en-
tropy of order 2. Combining this theorem to the smoothing method, he provided
the evaluation for the secrecy of final random variable. However, application of
smoothing has several difficulty. In this paper, we derive another type of privacy
amplification theorem by using the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 1 + s.
Then, we can directly show the security without smoothing when the final key
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size is smaller than the conditional entropy. That is, our proof is more direct as
is mention below.
In this paper, we use a security criterion for leaked information and the differ-
ence from the uniform distribution by modifying the quantum mutual informa-
tion. Using the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 1+ s, we propose other types
of privacy amplification theorems under the above criterion. The fundamental
theorem for this purpose is derived by extending classical privacy amplification
theorems obtained by [13,14]. Using one of these theorems, we derive an expo-
nential decreasing rate of the criterion. That is, when the extracted key rate is
less than the conditional entropy, the criterion goes to zero exponentially. Then,
we derive an exponential decreasing rate for leaked information, whose commu-
tative case is the same as that by [13]. Our derivation is contrastive with [11] in
the point that our method does not employ smoothing method. Our exponent
is better than that given in [11] under the modified quantum mutual informa-
tion criterion. Further, using the Pinsker inequality, we apply our result to the
criterion for the trace norm distance.
When the extracted key rate is larger than the conditional entropy, the leaked
information does not go to zero. In this case, we focus on the minimum condi-
tional entropy rate. The rate is called the equivocation rate [3] and the quantum
version has not been treated until now. Then, we derive the equivocation rate
as by treating the minimum leaked information rate. The smoothing method
cannot evaluate the leaked information rate in this case while the smoothing
method can derive lower bounds for exponential decreasing rate[11]. Since our
method directly evaluate the information amount leaked to the eavesdropper, it
enable us to derive the equivocation rate.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we prepare quantum versions
of information quantities. In Section 3, we formulate our setting and derive
the exponents of leaked information when the key generation rate is less than
the conditional entropy rate. In Section 4, we compare our exponents with the
exponents given by the smoothing method in [11]. In Section 5, we derive the
equivocation rate as the minimum conditional entropy for a given key generation
rate. The proofs for Theorem 1 and 2 are given in Appendix.
2. Information quantities
In order to treat leaked information after universal2 privacy amplification in
the quantum setting, we prepare several information quantities in a composite
system Ha ⊗HE , in which, Ha is a classical system spanned by the basis {|a〉}.
When the composite state is ρ =
∑
a P (a)|a〉〈a|⊗ρa, the von Neumann entropies
and Renyi entropies are given as
H(A,E|ρ) := −Tr ρ log ρ
H(E|ρ) := −Tr ρE log ρE
H1+s(A,E|ρ) := −1
s
logTr ρ1+s
H1+s(E|ρ) := −1
s
logTr (ρE)1+s
with s ∈ R and ρE = TrAρ. When we focus on the total system of a given
density ρ, H(A,E|ρ) and H1+s(A,E|ρ) are simplified to H(ρ) and H1+s(ρ).
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Two kinds of quantum versions of the conditional entropy and conditional
Renyi entropy are given for s ∈ R:
H(A|E|ρ) := H(A,E|ρ)−H(E|ρ)
H(A|E|ρ) := −Tr ρ log(IA ⊗ (ρE)−1/2ρIA ⊗ (ρE)−1/2)
H1+s(A|E|ρ) := −1
s
logTr ρ1+sIA ⊗ (ρE)−s
H
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ) :=
−1
s
logTr ρ(IA ⊗ (ρE)−1/2ρIA ⊗ (ρE)−1/2)s.
The quantity H1+s(A|E|ρ) is used for the exponential decreasing rate for the
security criterion in Section III while H
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ) is used for our derivation of
the equivocation rate in Section IV. Indeed, while the quantity H
∗
2(A|E|ρ) is the
same as the quantity H2(A|E|ρ) given in [8] and the quantity H2(A|E|ρ) given
in [11], the quantity H
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ) is different from the quantity H1+s(A|E|ρ)
given in [11] with 0 < s < 1.
Since the functions s 7→ sH1+s(A|E|ρ) and
s 7→ sH∗1+s(A|E|ρ) are concave and 0H1(A|E|ρ) = 0H1(A|E|ρ) = 0,H1+s(A|E|ρ)
andH
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ) are monotone decreasing for s ∈ R. Since lims→∞H
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ)
coincides with the min entropy Hmin(A|E|ρ) := − log ‖IA ⊗ (ρE)−1/2ρIA ⊗
(ρE)−1/2‖,H∗1+s(A|E|ρ) ≥ Hmin(A|E|ρ). SinceH2(A|E|ρ) = − logTr ρ(ρ1/2(IA⊗
ρE)−1ρ1/2), we haveH1+s(A|E|ρ) ≥ H2(A|E|ρ) ≥ − log ‖(ρ1/2(IA⊗ρE)−1ρ1/2)‖ =
− log ‖IA ⊗ (ρE)−1/2ρIA ⊗ (ρE)−1/2‖ = Hmin(A|E|ρ) for s ∈ (0, 1]. Further,
since lims→0H1+s(A|E|ρ) = H(A|E|ρ) and lims→0H∗1+s(A|E|ρ) = H(A|E|ρ),
we have
H(A|E|ρ) ≥ H1+s(A|E|ρ), (1)
H(A|E|ρ) ≥ H∗1+s(A|E|ρ) (2)
for s ∈ (0, 1].
Then, the correlation between A and HE can be evaluated by two kinds of
quantum versions of the mutual information
I(A : E|ρ) := D(ρ‖ρA ⊗ ρE) (3)
I(A : E|ρ) := D(ρ‖ρA ⊗ ρE) (4)
D(ρ‖σ) := Tr ρ(log ρ− log σ) (5)
D(ρ‖σ) := Tr ρ log(σ−1/2ρσ−1/2). (6)
By using the completely mixed state ρAmix on A, two kinds of quantum versions
of the mutual information can be modified to
I ′(A : E|ρ) := D(ρ‖ρAmix ⊗ ρE)
= I(A : E|ρ) +D(ρA‖ρAmix) (7)
= I(A : E|ρ) +H(A|ρAmix)−H(A|ρA) (8)
I ′(A : E|ρ) := D(ρ‖ρAmix ⊗ ρE), (9)
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which satisfy
I(A : E|ρ) ≤ I ′(A : E|ρ)
I(A : E|ρ) ≤ I ′(A : E|ρ)
and
H(A|E|ρ) = −I ′(A : E|ρ) + log |A| (10)
H(A|E|ρ) = −I ′(A : E|ρ) + log |A|. (11)
Indeed, the quantity I(A : E|ρA,E) represents the amount of information
leaked to E, and the remaining quantity D(ρA‖ρAmix) describes the difference of
the random number A from the uniform random number. So, if the quantity
I ′(A : E|ρA,E) is small, we can conclude that the random number A has less
correlation with E and is close to the uniform random number. In particular, if
the quantity I ′(A : E|ρA,E) goes to zero, the mutual information I(A : E|ρA,E)
goes to zero, and the state ρA goes to the completely mixed state ρAmix. Hence,
we can adopt the quantity I ′(A : E|ρA,E) as a criterion for qualifying the secret
random number.
Using the trace norm, we can evaluate the secrecy for the state ρ as follows:
d1(A : E|ρ) := ‖ρ− ρA ⊗ ρE‖1. (12)
Taking into account the randomness, Renner [8] defined the following criteria
for security of a secret random number:
d′1(A : E|ρ) := ‖ρ− ρAmix ⊗ ρE‖1. (13)
Using the quantum version of Pinsker inequality, we obtain
d1(A : E|ρ)2 ≤ I(A : E|ρ) (14)
d′1(A : E|ρ)2 ≤ I ′(A : E|ρ). (15)
When we apply the function f to the classical random number a ∈ A,
H(f(A), E|ρ) ≤ H(A,E|ρ), i.e.,
H(f(A)|E|ρ) ≤ H(A|E|ρ). (16)
As is shown in [11], when we apply a quantum operation E on HE , since it
does not act on the classical system A,
H(A|E|E(ρ)) ≥ H(A|E|ρ) (17)
H1+s(A|E|E(ρ)) ≥ H1+s(A|E|ρ). (18)
When the state σ has the spectral decomposition σ =
∑
i siEi, the pinching
map Eσ is defined as
Eσ(ρ) :=
∑
i
EiρEi. (19)
When v is the number of the eigenvalues of σ, the inequality
ρ ≤ vEσ(ρ) (20)
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holds[1, Lemma 3.8],[10]. Hence, we obtain
σ−1/2ρσ−1/2 ≤ vσ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2. (21)
As x 7→ log x is matrix monotone,
log σ−1/2ρσ−1/2 ≤ log v + log σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2. (22)
Since
Tr ρ log σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2 = Tr Eσ(ρ) log σ−1/2Eσ(ρ)σ−1/2, (23)
we obtain
D(ρ‖σ) ≤ D(Eσ(ρ)‖σ) + log v = D(Eσ(ρ)‖σ) + log v. (24)
Therefore, when v is the number of the eigenvalues of ρE :=
∑
a p(a)ρ
E
a , an
inequality
I(A : E|ρ) ≤ I(A : E|EρE (ρ)) + log v
= I(A : E|EρE (ρ)) + log v (25)
holds. Using these relations, we can show the following lemma.
Lemma 1
H
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ) ≥ H1+s(A|E|ρ). (26)
Proof. Applying (21) to the case of σ = ρE , we obtain
(ρE)−1/2ρ(ρE)−1/2 ≤ v(ρE)−1/2EρE (ρ)(ρE)−1/2.
Since x→ xs is matrix monotone, we obtain
[(ρE)−1/2ρ(ρE)−1/2]s ≤ vs[(ρE)−1/2EρE (ρ)(ρE)−1/2]s.
Hence,
e−sH
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ) = Tr ρ[(ρE)−1/2ρ(ρE)−1/2]s
≤vsTr ρ[(ρE)−1/2EρE (ρ)(ρE)−1/2]s
=vsTr EρE (ρ)[(ρE)−1/2EρE (ρ)(ρE)−1/2]s = vse−sH
∗
1+s(A|E|EρE (ρ))
=vse−sH1+s(A|E|EρE (ρ)) ≤ vse−sH1+s(A|E|ρ),
where (18) is used in the final inequality. Letting vn be the number of eigenvalues
of (ρE)⊗n, we obtain
nH
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ) +
log vsn
s
= H
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ⊗n) +
log vsn
s
≥H1+s(A|E|ρ⊗n) = nH1+s(A|E|ρ).
Taking the limit n→∞, we obtain (26).
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3. Formulation and exponential decreasing rate
We consider the secure key extraction problem from a common classical ran-
dom number a ∈ A which has been partially eavesdropped as quantum states
by Eve. For this problem, it is assumed that Alice and Bob share a common
classical random number a ∈ A, and Eve has a quantum state ρa ∈ HE , which
is correlated to the random number a. The task is to extract a common random
number f(a) from the random number a ∈ A, which is almost independent of
Eve’s quantum state. Here, Alice and Bob are only allowed to apply the same
function f to the common random number a ∈ A as Fig. 1. Now, we focus on an
ensemble of the functions fX from A to {1, . . . ,M}, where X denotes a random
variable describing the stochastic behavior of the function f . An ensemble of the
functions fX is called universal2 when it satisfies the following condition[4]:
Condition 1 ∀a1 6= ∀a2 ∈ A, the probability that fX(a1) = fX(a2) is at most
1
M .
a ∈ AAlice
correlated
Eveaρ
f
Alice ( )f a ∈M Eve( )f aρ
{1, , }M
:
=
almost no correlation
Hash
function
Fig. 1. Application of hash function
Indeed, when the cardinality |A| is a power of a prime power q and M is
another power of the same prime power q, an ensemble {fX} satisfying the both
conditions is given by the the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity
(X, I)[5] only with logq |A| − 1 random variables taking values in the finite filed
Fq. That is, the matrix (X, I) has small complexity.
Theorem 1 When the ensemble of the functions {fX} is universal2, it satisfies
I(fX(A) : E,X|ρ, PX) ≤ I ′(fX(A) : E,X|ρ, PX) = EXI ′(fX(A) : E|ρ)
≤v
sM s
s
e−sH1+s(A|E|ρ) = vs
es(logM−H1+s(A|E|ρ))
s
, (27)
where v is the number of eigenvalues of ρE.
That is, there exists a function f : A → {1, . . . ,M} such that
I ′(f(A) : E|ρ) ≤ vs e
s(logM−H1+s(A|E|ρ))
s
. (28)
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Next, we consider the case when our state is given by the n-fold independent
and identical state ρ, i.e., ρ⊗n. We define the optimal generation rate
G(ρ)
:= sup
{(fn,Mn)}

 limn→∞
logMn
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
lim
n→∞
I(fn(A) : E|ρ⊗n)
n
= 0
lim
n→∞
H(fn(A)|ρ⊗n)
logMn
= 1


= sup
{(fn,Mn)}
{
lim
n→∞
logMn
n
∣∣∣∣ limn→∞
I ′(fn(A) : E|ρ⊗n)
n
= 0
}
,
whose classical version is treated by [2]. The second equation holds as follows. the
condition limn→∞
H(fn(A)|ρ
⊗n)
logMn
= 1 is equivalent with limn→∞
D(ρfn(A)‖ρ
fn(A)
mix )
n =
0. Hence, limn→∞
I(fn(A):E|ρ
⊗n)
n = 0 and limn→∞
H(fn(A)|ρ
⊗n)
logMn
= 1 if and only if
limn→∞
I′(fn(A):E|ρ
⊗n)
n = 0.
When the generation rate R = limn→∞
logMn
n is smaller than H(A|E), there
exists a sequence of functions fn : A → {1, . . . , enR} such that
I ′(fn(A) : E|ρ⊗n) ≤ vsn
es(R−H1+s(A|E|ρ
⊗n))
s
, (29)
where vn is the number of eigenvalues of (ρ
E)⊗n, which is a polynomial increasing
for n. Since lims→0H1+s(A|E|ρ)) = H(A|E|ρ)), there exists a number s ∈ (0, 1]
such that s(R − H1+s(A|E|ρ)) > 0. Thus, the right hand side of (29) goes to
zero exponentially. Conversely, due to (16), any sequence of functions fn : An 7→
{1, . . . , enR} satisfies that
lim
n→∞
H(fn(A)|E|ρ⊗n)
n
≤ H(A|E|ρ
⊗n)
n
= H(A|E|ρ). (30)
When limn→∞
H(fn(A)|ρ
⊗n)
nR = 1,
lim
n→∞
I(fn(A) : E|ρ⊗n)
n
= R− lim
n→∞
H(fn(A)|E|ρ⊗n)
n
≥ R−H(A|E|ρ). (31)
That is, when R > H(A|E|ρ), I(fn(A):E|ρ⊗n)n does not go to zero. Hence, we
obtain
G(ρ) = H(A|E|ρ) (32)
In order to treat the speed of this convergence, we focus on the supremum of
the exponentially decreasing rate (exponent) of I ′(fn(A) : E|ρ⊗n) for a given R
eI(ρ|R)
:= sup
{(fn,Mn)}
{
lim
n→∞
− log I ′(fn(A) : E|ρ⊗n)
n
∣∣∣∣ limn→∞
− logMn
n
≤R
}
.
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Since the relation sH1+s(A|E|ρ⊗n) = nsH1+s(A|E|ρ) holds, the inequality (29)
implies that
eI(ρ|R) ≥ eH(ρ|R) := max
0≤s≤1
sH1+s(A|E|ρ) − sR
= max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|E|ρ)−R), (33)
whose commutative version coincides with the bound given in [13].
Next, we apply our evaluation to the criterion d′1(A : E|ρ). When {fX} sat-
isfies Condition 1, combining (15) and (27), we obtain
EXd
′
1(fX(A) : E|ρ) ≤
√
EXd′1(fX(A) : E|ρ)2
≤v
s/2M s/2√
s
e−
s
2H1+s(A|E|ρ). (34)
That is, in the n-fold asymptotic setting, when the generation key rate is R,
we focus on the supremum of the exponentially decreasing rate (exponent) of
I(fn(A) : E|ρ⊗n) for a given R
ed(ρ|R)
:= sup
{(fn,Mn)}
{
lim
n→∞
− log d′1(fn(A) : E|ρ⊗n)
n
∣∣∣∣ limn→∞
− logMn
n
≤R
}
.
Then, the inequality (34) implies that ed(ρ|R) ≥ eH (ρ|R)2 , whose commutative
version is smaller than the bound given in [12].
4. Comparison with smoothing method
The paper [11] derived lower bounds for eI(ρ|R) and ed(ρ|R). In order describe
them, we introduce an information quantity φ(s|A|E|ρA,E):
φ(s|A|E|ρA,E) := logTrE(TrA(ρA,E)1/(1−s))1−s
= logTrE(
∑
a
PA(a)1/(1−s)ρ1/(1−s)a )
1−s.
This quantity satisfies the following lemma.
Lemma 2 [11, Lemma 11] The inequalities
sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E) ≥− φ(s|A|E|ρA,E) (35)
sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E) ≤− (1 + s)φ( s
1 + s
|A|E|ρA,E) (36)
hold for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
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Then, the paper [11] showed that
ed(ρ|R) ≥eφ,q(ρA,E |R) (37)
eI(ρ|R) ≥eH,q(ρA,E |R) (38)
eI(ρ|R) ≥eφ,q(ρA,E |R), (39)
where
eφ,q(ρ
A,E |R) := max
0≤s≤1
−1 + s
2
φ(
s
1 + s
|ρA,E)− s
2
R
= max
0≤t≤ 12
− 1
2(1− t)φ(t|ρ
A,E)− t
2(1− t)R
eH,q(ρ
A,E |R) := max
0≤s≤1
s
2− s (H1+s(A|E|ρ
A,E)−R).
As a relation, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3
eH(ρ|R) ≥eH,q(ρA,E |R) (40)
eH(ρ|R) ≥eφ,q(ρA,E |R) (41)
1
2
eH(ρ|R) ≤eφ,q(ρA,E |R). (42)
Hence, our lower bound eH(ρ|R) for eI(ρ|R) is better than those given in [11].
However, our lower bound 12eH(ρ|R) for ed(ρ|R) is not as good as that given
in [11]. This fact implies that our method is better under the modified mutual
information criterion than the smoothing method used in [11].
Proof.
eH(ρ|R) = max
0≤s≤1
s(H1+s(A|E|ρ)−R)
≥ max
0≤s≤1
s
2− s (H1+s(A|E|ρ)−R) = eH,q(ρ|R),
which implies (40). Further, (35) yields that
eφ,q(ρ
A,E |R) = max
0≤t≤ 12
− 1
2(1− t)φ(t|ρ
A,E)− t
2(1− t)R
≤ max
0≤t≤ 12
t
2(1− t)H1+t(A|E|ρ) −
t
2(1− t)R
= max
0≤t≤ 12
t
2(1− t) (H1+t(A|E|ρ)−R)
= max
0≤t≤ 12
t(H1+t(A|E|ρ)−R)
≤ max
0≤t≤1
t(H1+t(A|E|ρ)−R) = eH(ρ|R),
which implies (41).
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Finally, (36) yields that
1
2
eH(ρ
A,E |R) = max
0≤s≤1
s
2
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E)− s
2
R
≤ max
0≤s≤1
−1 + s
2
φ(
s
1 + s
|A|E|ρA,E)− s
2
R = eφ,q(ρ
A,E |R),
which implies (42).
5. Equivocation rate
Next, we consider the case when logM is larger than H(A|E).
Theorem 2 When the ensemble of the functions {fX} is universal2, it satisfies
EXe
sI′(fX(A):E|ρ) ≤ 1 +M se−sH∗1+s(A|E|ρ)
= 1 + es(logM−H
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ)). (43)
Using (43) and the concavity of x 7→ log x , we obtain
sEXI
′(fX(A) : E|ρ) ≤ log EXesI
′(fX(A):E|ρ)
≤ log(1 + es(logM−H∗1+s(A|E|ρ))) ≤ es(logM−H∗1+s(A|E|ρ)),
which can be regarded as another version of (27).
Hence, (25), (43), and (18) guarantee that
EXe
sI′(fX(A):E|ρ) ≤ vsEXesI
′(fX(A):E|EρE (ρ))
≤vs(1 +M se−sH
∗
1+s(A|E|EρE (ρ)))
=vs(1 +M se−sH1+s(A|E|EρE (ρ)))
≤vs(1 +M se−sH1+s(A|E|ρ)) = vs(1 + es(logM−H1+s(A|E|ρ))),
where v is the number of eigenvalues of ρE . Since
log vs(1 + es(logM−H1+s(A|E|ρ)))
=s log v + log(1 + es(logM−H1+s(A|E|ρ)))
≤s log v + log 2 + logmax{1, es(logM−H1+s(A|E|ρ))}
=s log v + log 2 + max{0, s(logM −H1+s(A|E|ρ))},
using (10), we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3 There exists a function f : A 7→ {1, . . . ,M} such that
logM −H(f(A)|E|ρ) = I ′(f(A) : E|ρ)
≤ log v + log 2
s
+max{0, logM −H1+s(A|E|ρ)}.
for s ∈ (0, 1].
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Next, we consider the case when our state is given by the n-fold independent
and identical state ρ, i.e., ρ⊗n. Then, we define the equivocation rate as the
maximum Eve’s ambiguity rate for the given key generation rate R:
R(R|ρ) := sup
{fn}
{ lim
n→∞
H(fn(A)|E|ρ⊗n)
n
| lim
n→∞
H(fn(A)|ρ⊗n)
nR
= 1},
where the supremum takes the map fn that maps fromAn to {1, . . . , enR}. Then,
we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4 When the key generation rate R is greater than H(A|E|ρ),
R(R|ρ) = H(A|E|ρ). (44)
Indeed, using the above theorem, we can calculate the minimum information
rate for the given key generation rate R as follows.
inf
{fn}
{ lim
n→∞
I(E : fn(A)|ρ⊗n)
n
| lim
n→∞
H(fn(A)|ρ⊗n)
nR
= 1}
=max{R−H(A|E|ρ), 0}.
Proof. When the key generation rate R, i.e., Mn = e
nR, there exists a sequence
of functions fn : An 7→ {1, . . . ,Mn} such that
R− lim
n→∞
H(E|fn(A)|ρ⊗n)
n
≤ max{0, R−H1+s(A|E|ρ)}
for s ∈ (0, 1]. Then, taking the limit s→ 0, we obtain
R − lim
n→∞
H(E|fn(A)|ρ⊗n)
n
≤ max{0, R−H(A|E|ρ)},
which implies the part ≤ of (44). Converse inequality ≥ follows from (30).
6. Conclusion
We have derived an upper bound of information leaked to quantum attacker in
the modified quantum mutual information criterion when we apply universal2
hash functions. In the commutative case, our lower bound coincides with the
bound given in [13]. In the non-commutative case, our bound is different from
Renner[8]’s two universal hashing lemma even in s = 1 because Renner[8]’s result
is based on H
∗
2(A|E|ρ) but ours is based on H1+s(A|E|ρ).
Applying our bound to the i.i.d. case, we obtain a lower bound for the ex-
ponential decreasing rate for information leaked to quantum attacker under the
modified mutual information criterion. Our lower bound is better than lower
bounds derived by the smoothing method in [11].
Further, we have derived the asymptotic equivocation rate. In oder to show it,
we have derived a quantum version of privacy amplification theorems, whose clas-
sical version is given in [13,14]. In this quantum version, we employH
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ)
instead ofH1+s(A|E|ρ). In the second step for the derivation, we employH1+s(A|E|ρ).
Then, the asymptotic equivocation rate can be characterized byH(A|E|ρ), which
is given by the limit lims→0H1+s(A|E|ρ).
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A. Proof of Theorem 1
In order to show Theorem 1, we prepare the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4 The matrix inequality (I +X)s ≤ I +Xs holds with a non-negative
matrix X and s ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Since I is commutative with X , it is sufficient to show that (1 + x)s ≤
1 + xs for x ≥ 0. This inequality is trivial.
Lemma 5 The matrix inequality log(I +X) ≤ 1sXs holds with a non-negative
matrix X and s ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Since I is commutative with X , it is sufficient to show that log(1+x) ≤ xss
for x ≥ 0. Since the inequalities (1 + x)s ≤ 1 + xs and log(1 + x) ≤ x hold for
x ≥ 0 and 0 < s ≤ 1, the inequalities
log(1 + x) =
log(1 + x)s
s
≤ log(1 + x
s)
s
≤ x
s
s
(45)
hold.
Now, we prove Theorem 1.
EXI
′(fX(A) : E|ρ)
=EXD(
M∑
i=1
|i〉〈i| ⊗
∑
a:fX(a)=i
P (a)ρa‖ 1
M
I ⊗ ρE)
=EX
∑
a
TrP (a)ρa(log(
∑
a′:fX(a′)=fX(a)
P (a′)ρa′)− log 1
M
ρE)
≤
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(log(EX
∑
a′:fX(a′)=fX(a)
P (a′)ρa′)− log 1
M
ρE) (46)
=
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(log(P (a)ρa
+ EX
∑
a′:fX(a′)=fX(a),a′ 6=a
P (a′)ρa′)− log 1
M
ρE)
≤
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(log(P (a)ρa
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+
1
M
∑
a′:a′ 6=a
P (a′)ρa′)− log 1
M
ρE) (47)
≤
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(log(P (a)ρa +
1
M
ρE)− log 1
M
ρE)
≤
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(log(vP (a)EρE (ρa) +
1
M
ρE)− log 1
M
ρE) (48)
=
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa log(vMP (a)EρE (ρa)(ρE)−1 + I),
where (46) follows from the matrix convexity of x 7→ log x, (47) follows from
Condition 1 and the matrix monotonicity of x 7→ log x, and (48) follows from
(20) and the matrix monotonicity of x 7→ log x.
Using Lemma 5, we obtain
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa log(vMP (a)EρE (ρa)(ρE)−1 + I)
≤1
s
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(vMP (a)EρE (ρa)(ρE)−1)s
=
vsM s
s
∑
a
P (a)1+sTr EρE (ρa)1+s(ρE)−s
=
vsM s
s
esH1+s(A|E|EI⊗ρE (ρ)) ≤ v
sM s
s
esH1+s(A|E|ρ), (49)
where (49) follows from (18).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The relations (2) and (11) imply
sI ′(A : E|ρ) ≤ log
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(|A|P (a)(ρE)−1/2ρa(ρE)−1/2)s.
Therefore,
EXe
sI′(fX(A):E|ρ)
≤EX
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(M(ρ
E)−1/2(
∑
a′:fX(a′)=fX(a)
P (a′)ρa′)(ρ
E)−1/2)s
≤
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(M(ρ
E)−1/2EX(
∑
a′:fX(a′)=fX(a)
P (a′)ρa′)(ρ
E)−1/2)s (50)
=
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(M(ρ
E)−1/2(P (a)ρa + EX(
∑
a′:fX(a′)=fX(a),a 6=a′
P (a′)ρa′))(ρ
E)−1/2)s
≤
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(M(ρ
E)−1/2(P (a)ρa +
1
M
(
∑
a′:a 6=a′
P (a′)ρa′))(ρ
E)−1/2)s (51)
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≤
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(M(ρ
E)−1/2(P (a)ρa +
1
M
ρE)(ρE)−1/2)s
=
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(I +MP (a)(ρ
E)−1/2ρa(ρ
E)−1/2)s
≤
∑
a
P (a)Tr ρa(I +M
sP (a)s((ρE)−1/2ρa(ρ
E)−1/2)s) (52)
=1 +M s
∑
a
P (a)1+sTr ρa((ρ
E)−1/2ρa(ρ
E)−1/2)s)
=1 +M se−sH
∗
1+s(A|E|ρ)
where (50) follows from the matrix convexity of x 7→ xs, and (51) follows from
Condition 1 and the matrix monotonicity of x 7→ xs, and (52) follows from
Lemma 4.
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